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Resumo 
  A água é essencial à sobrevivência humana. Uma economia política 
humanizada, isto é dirigida para a satisfação das necessidades básicas, deve preocupar-
se com a questão da disponibilidade e distribuição de água. No que diz respeito à 
satisfação das necessidades básicas, podemos afirmar que é relativamente fácil e barato 
fornecer água para todos. Porque razão, então existe uma desigualdade na distribuição? 
Esta desigualdade representa uma violação séria de um direito humano, como será 
desenvolvido à frente, e não deverá ser tolerada. Este artigo trata do papel que a 
economia desempenha no desigual exercício do direito humano de acesso à água 
potável. 
  Este artigo examina como o discurso da economia dominante pode entrar em 
conflito com os direitos humanos em geral, e o direito à água em particular. No âmbito 
da teoria económica dominante, a satisfação de necessidades implica a utilização de 
conceitos como preço, oferta, procura, custos e benefícios, e por conseguinte a questão é 
capacidade de pagar ou poder de compra. Com os direitos, o assunto é diferente, sendo a 
questão principal, o critério de acordo com o qual um indivíduo está habilitado a 
usufruir dos direitos, não podendo por isso ser utilizado o critério do poder de compra. 
Para a economia é perfeitamente admissível excluir do acesso à água aqueles que não 
têm capacidade de pagar, violando princípios básicos dos direitos humanos.     
A economia dominante ao pôr toda a ênfase no mercado como a instituição 
reguladora, torna invisível o direito humano à água. Por um lado o mercado é ineficiente 
em atingir uma cobertura universal de água potável e por outro lado o mercado é uma  
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instituição que não presta contas e a satisfação dos direitos humanos precisa por 
princípio de ser submetido ao controlo democrático.  
 
Abstract 
Water being essential to human survival, a humane political economy, in other 
words a political economy directed to satisfying human basic needs, should be 
especially concerned with the issue of water availability and distribution. In what the 
satisfaction of basic needs is concerned, one could fairly safely state that it is relatively 
easy and cheap to provide access to water to everybody. Why is there such inequality in 
its distribution then? This inequality represents a serious violation of a human right, as it 
will be developed in the paper, and, therefore, should not be tolerated. The issue this 
paper wishes to address concerns the role played by economics in the unequal assertion 
of every people’s human right to clean water.  
  First of all, what are we talking about when we talk about economics? A rapid 
overview can identify at least twenty schools of economic thought, from neoclassic to 
evolutionary, from Marxist to post-Keynesian. If one had to be accurate, a paper on the 
impact of economics on the human right to water human rights would, then, have to be 
divided in at least twenty chapters. The sort of economics we will be referring to in this 
paper results from a considerably narrower point of view, though. Economics, here, will 
be mainstream economics, the school of thought which dominates not only within the 
academia, but also within the political cabinets and the media. 
  More specifically, this paper will examine how mainstream economics discourse 
can be conflictive with human rights in general and the right to water in particular. First 
of all,  within mainstream economic analysis satisfying wants implies the use of 
concepts like prices, supply and demand, or cost and benefit, and therefore, the issue is 
capability to pay, in other words purchasing power. With rights, on the other hand, the 
issue is quite different; the heart of the matter here concerns entitlement, the criteria 
according to which an individual should qualify to enjoy rights, purchasing power being 
obviously excluded, and the consequences of the use of such criteria. Therefore it is 
perfectly admissible for economics to exclude from access to water those that do not 
have the capability to pay violating the basic principles of human rights. 
  Secondly by putting emphasis on the market as the default regulation institution 
mainstream economics also hinders the human right to water because on the one hand 
the market is inefficient in reaching universal coverage of water supply and on the other 
hand it is an unaccountable institution and human rights purveyors need by principle to 
be submitted to democratic control. 
Key Words: Human rights, Water, Market 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  Water is at the origin of life on earth, no organism can live without water under 
any of its forms; as a mater of fact all living beings, humans included, live in an 
aqueous environment. For a long time water was considered an element and it was only 
in the eighteenth century with the works of Henry Cavendish that it has been  
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demonstrated that water consisted, after all, in a combination of two atoms of Hydrogen 
and one of Oxygen. Two centuries later, as a result of the development of research in 
social sciences, other decompositions of water have been revealed. Indeed, we know 
now that water is also an economic, social and cultural good, and, if only it mattered, all 
there is left to discover is the exact proportion in which it can be decomposed as a good 
intended to satisfy the ever-growing range of human needs. 
 
  Now, despite water being essential to human life, in its many dimensions, access 
to it is far from being guaranteed to everybody, and amidst those communities which 
benefit from this access, water is also far from being distributed equitably. The World 
Health Organization believes that more than a billion people are deprived of a basic 
access to water (WHO, 2001:1) The United Nations Organization, in its turn, estimates 
that about 2.3 billion people suffer from diseases connected to water, in other words to 
both its shortage and poor quality (UN, 1997: 39). 
 
  Water being essential to human survival, a humane political economy, in other 
words a political economy directed to satisfying human basic needs, should be 
especially concerned with the issue of water availability and distribution. In what the 
satisfaction of basic needs is concerned, one could fairly safely state that it is relatively 
easy and cheap to provide access to water to everybody. Why is there such inequality in 
its distribution then? In many developing countries where access to water is guaranteed 
inequality prevails through discriminatory pricing, for instance. Indeed, poorer 
households often pay more for water than richer ones. According to the 2006 Human 
Development report households living in slums pay five to ten times more for water 
than wealthier households in developing world cities (UNDP, 2006:10). This inequality 
represents a serious violation of a human right, as it will be developed further ahead, 
and, therefore, should not be tolerated. 
 
  The issue this paper wishes to address concerns the role played by economics in 
the unequal assertion of every people’s human right to clean water. First of all, what are 
we talking about when we talk about economics? A rapid overview can identify at least 
twenty schools of economic thought, from neoclassic to evolutionary, from Marxist to 
post-Keynesian. If one had to be accurate, a paper on the impact of economics on the 
human right to water would, then, have to be divided in at least twenty chapters. The 
sort of economics we will be referring to in this paper results from a considerably 
narrower point of view, though. Economics, here, will be mainstream economics, the 
school of thought which dominates not only within the academia, but also within the 
political cabinets and the media. 
 
  Mainstream economics, as any other school of thought, is characterized by its 
particular methodology, its particular rationality ands its particular analytical weaponry. 
Mainstream economics is, therefore, individualistic, utilitarian and equilibrium driven, 
and, finally, excessively worried with mathematical formalization. Being individualistic 
mainstream economics defines its goals in terms of the pursuit of isolated individual’s 
personal interest, social welfare, for instance, being the sum of each individual’s  
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welfare. Being utilitarian and equilibrium driven, mainstream economics is oriented 
towards the maximization of the individual’s utility, in short monetary income, and the 
social equilibrium of supply and demand, the market, with its automatic paraphernalia, 
being the right institution called to regulate this process. Being excessively worried with 
mathematical formalization, mainstream economics privileges quantitative cause and 
effect analysis, and unrealistically reduces society’s complexity in order to discover 
scientific laws similar to those governing nature’s realm. 
 
  More specifically, this paper will examine how mainstream economics discourse 
can be conflictive with human rights in general and the right to water in particular. In 
the following lines we will, first of all, confront the satisfaction of wants and the 
maximization of utility that characterizes economics with the promotion of human 
rights, and, then, we will show why the ideology of market hegemony preached by 
mainstream economics is contradictory with this same promotion of human rights, most 
especially in developing countries. Before engaging into that discussion let us look at 
water, both as an economic good and a human right. 
 
 
Water as an Economic Good 
 
  Until the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century the weak 
demographic pressure put on available resources led people, as well as economists, to 
take water as a free good, in other words as a good available for consumption according 
to the principle of the first come first served (Bontems and Rotillon, 1998). However, 
the fast pace of economic development that has characterized world economy since then 
boosted water consumption in order to meet all kinds of demands, which implied that 
water management had to be thought within a frame of scarcity, which, in turn, implied 
changes in the way water was classified as a good. This fact, along with the shocking 
gap between supply and demand, made that the right to water could also be expressed as 
an economic problem. The first step that must be taken in order to express the right to 
water as an economic problem consists in identifying what sort of economic good water 
is. The United Nations explicitly mentions water as a public good, but because this 
classification could appear at first sight as deriving from a political discourse rather than 
from an economic analysis, and in order to avoid misunderstandings, one should, thus, 
argue more carefully. 
 
  Economics divides goods in two main categories, public and private goods. In 
economics a public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This means 
that the consumption of this good by one individual does not reduce the amount of the 
good left for the consumption of other individuals, and that no individual can effectively 
be excluded from consuming that good. Take the example of a bowl of strawberries and 
cream. If one individual eats it, that particular bowl ceases to be available for the 
consumption of other individuals. It is also possible to prevent an individual from 
consuming the bowl of strawberries if he is not willing to pay for it. In this case there is 
that rivalry and exclusion which makes our bowl of strawberries and cream a private  
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good. On the contrary breathing air does not significantly reduce the amount of air 
available to others, nor can people be excluded from breathing it. That is why air is a 
public good, a pure public good one might even add.  
 
  Now, when economics states that individuals cannot be excluded from breathing 
air it is not stating a moral imperative, it is just saying that individuals cannot be 
prevented from breathing air because it is technically impossible to exclude from 
consumption individuals that are not willing to pay. Indeed, when economics states that 
an individual cannot be excluded from breathing air it is not alerting to the fact that an 
individual prevented from breathing air will just die, but plainly pointing to the fact that 
no individual can make a living out of selling breathing air because there is plenty of 
free air available. In the real world it is hard to stick to this categorisation of goods, 
though, especially when water is concerned. 
 
  Indeed, based on the combinations of exclusion and rivalry one can determine 
two other categories of goods. There are goods that are rivalrous but non-excludable and 
goods that are excludable but non-rivalrous. Goods that that fall into the first group are 
called common pool goods and goods that fall in the second group, toll or club goods. 
In the first case it is impossible or very hard to stop people from consuming these goods 
but the consumption of an individual limits the consumption of another individual. It is 
the case of fish in the ocean, for instance. One can freely fish in the ocean but the stock 
is limited and therefore excessive fishery by an individual can prevent another 
individual from fishing. In the other group, consumption of an individual does not affect 
the ability of another individual to consume in his turn, but it is possible to exclude 
individuals from consumption if they are not willing to pay. An often referred example 
is cable television. By watching a show an individual does not limit the ability of 
another individual to watch the same or another show, but if an individual does not pay 
for cable, service is cut. Now, what does this tell us about the classification of water as a 
good? 
 
  From a strict technical point of view classifying water is not an easy task. 
Sustainable consumption of water in nature, drinking it out of a river or a lake, does not 
imply rivalry nor does it provoke exclusion, and therefore in these circumstances water 
should be considered a public good. By sustaining that “Nothing is more useful than 
water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for 
it” Adam Smith (1776) suggested that water had no price which is another interpretation 
of a public good. Non-rivalry and non-exclusion are reinforced by the fact that there are 
no property rights on water in its first state, lets us say natural. 
 
  But fresh water may not be unlimited in the planet, especially if pollution and 
over-consumption continue at the current pace. For this  reason it should be more 
realistic to include water among common pool goods where unsustainability of 
consumption has been identified in the absence of strict distributive rules. Garrett 
Hardin in his famous article on the tragedy of commons shows how the inexistence of 
property rights along with the absence of distributive rules leads to an unsustainable use  
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of a resource (Hardin, 1968), and therefore, in the case of water, to eventually depriving 
every individual of a human right. Preservation and supply of common pool goods are, 
consequently, a collective responsibility, and thus, demands the presence of a public 
authority. The Tribunal de Las Águas in Valencia, Spain, is an institution that is more 
than a thousand years old and it still meets every week to allocate the use of the regional 
water distribution network for agriculture, demonstrating, once again, the longevity of 
water’s public character. 
 
  However, the form under which water appears before consumers today has not 
much to do with the classification proposed above. Indeed, the great majority of the 
world’s population benefits from water by the intermediation of infrastructures such as 
plumbing and other forms of collection and distribution. Well, contrary to water strictly 
speaking, these infrastructures can be privately appropriated which means that exclusion 
and rivalry can be simultaneously introduced in water supply. Indeed, one can be 
excluded from consuming water because one only has access to the water tap if one is 
wiling to pay, and there is rivalry because one’s water tap cannot be used without one’s 
permission. Therefore, technically speaking, in modern times, water could also be 
considered as a private good like any other. 
 
 
Water as a Human Right  
 
  The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states in its article 3 the unalienable 
right to life; a life which other articles take to be more than just plain survival, 
demanding on the contrary that it should meet the minimum standards of human dignity 
and that it should be enjoyed with freedom and safety. Well, this right to life demands 
some access to both those natural resources and manufactured goods that are considered 
to be indispensable to live according to the requirements described above. Natural 
resources that fall into this category could, then, be considered as some sort of common 
capital for existence (see Petrella, 2004), which implies a specific approach to both its 
exploitation and its distribution. In this sense, water, under almost all of its forms and 
all of its uses, should probably be the first of these resources to be listed among 
common capital items. Indeed, an adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent 
death by dehydration, to reduce the risk of diseases related to water and to attend to 
many other sorts of indispensable needs like farming or manufacturing, cooking or 
personal and domestic hygiene to which one should also add a wide range of cultural 
needs such as the performance of religious rites or the plain enjoyment of leisure. 
 
  It shouldn’t come as a surprised, then, that the imperious satisfaction of these 
needs has given birth to several pleads sustaining that water ought to be considered a 
human right. On April 2
nd 1998, a group of international personalities, such as former 
presidents of Portugal and Argentina, respectively Mário Soares and Raúl Alfonsin, 
issued a manifesto in which water was declared a common good belonging to all the 
inhabitants on earth and an unalienable individual and collective right. In response to 
that and to others pleads, and in the continuation of the International Covenant on  
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the general assembly of 
the United Nations in 1966, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights proclaimed, in November 2002, the Right to Water as a substantive 
implication of the implementation of the ICESCR, resulting from an extensive 
interpretation of its articles 11 and 12. 
 
  These articles state the following: 
 
  Article 11 
 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on 
free consent. 
 
  Article 12 
 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  
 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for:  
 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child;  
 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;  
 
  In the introduction of the text in which these substantive implications are 
commented,  it is said that water is a limited natural resource and a public good 
fundamental  for life and health, that this human right to water is indispensable for 
leading a life in human dignity and that it is a prerequisite for the realization of other 
human rights (UN, 2002: 1). According to this committee the human right to water 
entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable 
water for personal and domestic use. 
 
  The right to water, therefore, as the great majority of economic, social, and 
cultural rights has both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. From the quantitative 
point of view it is stated that everyone should be provided of an amount of water 
sufficient to meet human needs according to WHO parameters. This quantity is not easy 
to determine because it can vary according to cultural idiosyncrasies and geographical 
location, but it is assumed that a person needs a minimum of 20 litres per day (UNDP, 
2006: 8). This amount seems derisive when one knows that citizens in western 
developed countries spend more than that in just flushing their toilets, but even this  
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meagre quantity is not accessible to many in the planet. From the qualitative point of 
view, in turn, it is stressed that the amount of water provided should be safe, in other 
words its consumption should not put human health at risk. As commonly in human 
rights, it is added that no discrimination, based on gender, religion, or social condition, 
among others, should be tolerated in the access to this same water. 
 
  Now, if water strictly speaking can be classified as a public or a common pool 
good, and tap water as private, the entire process of providing safe water to people 
displays a double character. Nevertheless, because water is also a human right, one is 
technically forced to admit the preponderance of its public character. Indeed, if water 
constitutes a human right, because it is essential to life and a prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of other human rights, the excludable character of private goods, means, 
therefore, that excluding an individual from access to water based on purchasing power 
is equivalent to depriving that same individual of a universal human right. This 
immediately transforms the inability to get water into a rights violation, and 
consequently into a major political issue. 
 
 
The Conflicting Logics of Economics and of Human Rights 
 
  We will now argue that a political economy based on mainstream economics is 
contradictory with the assertion of the human right to clean water. The main reason for 
this unjustifiable contradiction is the fact that mainstream economics and human rights 
do not share the same language. Indeed, one can seldom find the concept of human 
rights within economic reasoning with the remarkable exceptions of its explicit 
incorporation of property rights and its implicit references to freedom of expression. As 
a matter of fact, both these rights constitute essential pillars of economic rationality as 
there is no such thing as personal interest without property rights and, although history 
has given us many examples of an unnatural cohabitation of economic freedom and 
political repression, separating rational choice from freedom of choice and, therefore, 
from freedom of expression, seems hardly conceivable. In both these cases it is the 
instrumental value of rights, in other words the value given to the consequences of 
adopting rights, rather than its intrinsic value that is being considered, though. Indeed, 
as a result of utilitarianism, rights, as Amartya Sen pointed out, are not intrinsically 
important for mainstream economics (Sen, 1993: 47). 
 
 
Wants versus rights 
 
  First of all one must admit that economic theory feels more comfortable dealing 
with wants rather than with rights. Within economic analysis satisfying wants implies 
the use of concepts like prices, supply and demand, or cost and benefit, and therefore, 
the issue is capability to pay, in other words purchasing power. With rights, on the other 
hand, the issue is quite different; the heart of the matter here concerns entitlement, the 
criteria according to which an individual should qualify to enjoy rights, purchasing  
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power being obviously excluded, and the consequences of the use of such criteria. 
Furthermore, while dealing with wants economics can take shelter in a positivist 
approach; dealing with rights, on the contrary, pushes it to risk normative stands, adding 
supplementary embarrassment to economics’ traditional insight. 
 
  In traditional economic theory efficiency and equity are dealt with separately. 
Whereas  efficiency, being essentially a technical issue, can be approached through 
positive analysis, equity, on account of its value judgment content, demands a 
normative approach. This separation has been severely questioned by many economists 
for a long time, but the fact is that within mainstream economics resources can be 
unequally allocated, for instance, without economic efficiency being the least troubled. 
As a matter of fact, from a normative liberal standpoint, inequality is perfectly 
compatible with social justice as long as the least favored layers of a community can 
improve their living conditions, as it ensues from the wording of John Rawls’ second 
principle of justice (Rawls, 1972). Besides inequality, economic efficiency can also 
tolerate exclusion of individuals from the distribution of resources when these are 
fastened by tight budget constraints.  
 
  None of this, that is to say inequality and exclusion is tolerable when rights are 
at stake. Rights, if they are to be fully taken as rights, must be equally allocated among 
all those entitled to enjoy them within the community. Basic liberties, for instance, do 
not admit another allocation than an equalitarian one (see Rawls, 1972). Indeed, one 
cannot accept that some individuals may deposit more votes  in the ballot box than 
others. Needless to remind that universal suffrage, confers one, and only one, vote to 
every citizen of age. Beyond the legitimate statutory exceptions, basic liberties do not 
admit exclusion either. If a citizen is arbitrarily excluded from participation in an 
election, this means not only that he was denied his right to vote but also that the right 
to vote is not ensured in the community to which he belongs, even if all except one are 
allowed to participate in the voting. Indeed, rights are either guaranteed for all or they 
aren’t for none. 
 
  Thus, the introduction of human rights, namely economic, social and cultural 
rights, into the economics theoretical body, forces economics to adopt an unnatural 
behavior, for to accept rights should mean to accept that the allocation of many goods 
and services must not forcibly observe market distributive rules. Economic efficiency 
does not oppose to this when public goods and services are concerned; but satisfying 
rights, economic and social rights in particular, goes way beyond the definition of 
distributive rules referring only to public goods and services. It regards private goods 
and services also, as determined by the above mentioned article 11 of the ICESCR - 
from which the right to water has been extracted - which declares the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. As 
private goods housing or tap water, for example, can be unequally distributed and can 
contemplate exclusion, that is to say homelessness and “drought”. As rights, housing  
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and water not only demand a distribution such as nobody is deprived of a shelter and of 
water, but also that some basic qualitative criteria must be met, normative issues which 
traditional economics is unwilling to address. 
 
  Another aspect that can enlighten us on the divorce between economics and 
human rights is the fact that there is an institution within which vocabulary equity and 
inclusion can be found; the state. Indeed, one of the state’s functions is to promote 
equity and inclusion in the allocation of its resources; therefore, the introduction of 
human rights language in economics means that the responsibility for the process of 
allocating private goods and services’ may have to be transferred from the market to the 
state, or some other collective institution. Well, given that traditional economics abhors 
state intervention, seen as an unbearable interference with the market, one shouldn’t be 
surprised if economics ends up displaying a notable distaste for a concept which 
contributes, precisely, to legitimize such interference.  
 
 
Utility versus Rights  
 
  Let us now take into consideration that human rights can be interpreted as the 
limits of losses individuals can tolerably endure for the benefit of others (see Dworkin, 
1978). Indeed, even when the promotion of noble social objectives is at stake, human 
rights must protect individuals, and particularly minorities, from policies that benefit the 
community as a whole, but which intolerably overcharge them. Promoting human rights 
should, therefore, institutionally guarantee that justice of means is equally important as 
nobility of ends. This safeguard is crucial when economics is confronted with human 
rights, as reaching the maximum of social utility, mainstream’s political economy 
founding design, may collide with some individuals’ utility or, in other words, rights.  
 
  Within mainstream economics the individual seeks to maximize his utility 
function, in other words he looks for the highest income possible. Considering all 
humans alike, this same mainstream economics interprets social utility as the sum of 
individual utilities, the utility of the community being, therefore, almost always 
measured by national income. This calculation system, despite being theoretically 
contested by many economists, has obtained, nevertheless, a recognition that overcomes 
the orthodox versus heterodox methodological fracture. Within this system it is 
perfectly conceivable, either from a formal or a moral point of view, that disutility, or 
negative utility, for an individual, may end up not only not affecting social utility but 
even contributing to raising it. Indeed, in Europe, since the  1970s, despite 
unemployment having been multiplied by a factor of three, meaning that many workers 
saw their individual utility being considerably reduced; national income, in other words 
social utility, kept growing vividly almost everywhere. 
 
  The introduction of rights language, on the contrary, radically changes the 
common welfare function. Indeed, depriving an individual from a particular right, or 
simply reducing its enjoyment, affects negatively the entire community. As opposed to  
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utility, the degree in which a right is guaranteed cannot be measured by the number of 
individuals enjoying it, but rather by the degree in which the purpose of that right is 
guaranteed for every individual. Therefore, the degree of democratic participation, for 
instance, cannot be measured by the number of individuals benefiting from the right to 
vote, but rather by the extent of the decisions that are submitted to the scrutiny of all. As 
we have seen before arbitrarily denying an individual the right to vote is equivalent to 
denying it to the whole of the community; even if, taken one by one, no other citizen 
seems to be affected. In this case, thus, arbitrary individual deprivation of the right to 
vote not only affects the maximization of democracy but can also represent a 
deprivation of democracy for the community as a whole. 
 
  A very well-known legal dilemma in the United States, US versus Holmes (see 
Harvey, 2002) perfectly illustrates the essence of this conflict. In the beginning of 
spring 1841 an American ship collided with an iceberg when crossing the North-
Atlantic, and rapidly sunk leaving 41 passengers and crew members squeezed in a 
precarious lifeboat. In spite of the lifeboat being overcharged the crew managed to keep 
it afloat for 24 hours thanks to favorable weather conditions. However, the following 
day these conditions got worse and began swamping the lifeboat hopelessly. Then, fully 
convinced that this precarious craft would soon sink and drag every castaway into the 
frozen depths of the ocean, the officer in  charge of the lifeboat ordered the crew 
members to throw overboard every male adult unaccompanied by their wives. Fourteen 
men, and two women that chose the same fate as their brothers, were sacrificed. Thus 
relieved, the lifeboat resisted to the inclemency and by the following dawn all the 
remaining passengers were rescued by a ship passing at a distance. 
 
  From the strict utilitarian point of view, the officer involved limited himself to 
maximize social utility given the constraints in terms of the lifeboat’s capacity and the 
weather conditions. The only alternative left to him was keeping every passenger aboard 
the lifeboat and condemn the lot to be swallowed by the liquid fury, depriving all, and 
not just a few, from their certainly very much esteemed life expectations. Comparing 
both solutions’ final degrees of utility, sacrificing sixteen passengers was perfectly 
legitimate, therefore. From the rights point of view, however, the outcome is manifestly 
contrasting. Indeed, the sacrificed passengers were not only deprived of their lives but 
also of their right to live, and consequently the rescuing of the remaining passengers 
could be considered a criminal act. That is exactly what happened in this story when the 
survivors were brought ashore. Anticipating all the legal complications their decision 
might bring them, all crew members fled, with the exception of one, who ended up 
being taken to court and sentenced to six months in prison for manslaughter. 
 
  The judge who pronounced the verdict, nevertheless, considered that the 
officer’s procedure could have been legitimate had he taken one of two options, the first 
being that members of the crew could have been sacrificed instead of passengers, this 
being interpreted has the fulfillment of a duty, and the second that the sacrificed could 
have been either voluntary or picked by drawing lots. In both these cases, the attempt on 
the victims’ lives could have been acceptable from a rights point of view. Indeed, we  
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strongly believe that voluntary renunciation to the right to live often constitutes a 
substantive assertion of this same right much more eloquent than its protection. It is the 
case of all those that in the course of history have died for causes they manifestly valued 
more than their own lives. 
 
  The verdict pronounced by the judge and his comments reveal that it was not the 
result of the officer’s decision that was condemned, but the process that led to it. In 
other words it was not the maximization of social utility, the sacrifice of passengers, 
that was illegitimate, but the arbitrariness of the process through which the victims were 
picked. Bear in mind that both the officer’s behavior and the alternatives proposed by 
the judge are equivalent in terms of result. This result, though, can be valued differently 
whether one looks at it from the point of view of social utility or from the point of view 
of individual rights. In the court’s verdict social utility constitutes a perfectly legitimate 
goal but under no circumstances it should overrule human rights. In this sense, seeking 
for the maximisation of national income, for instance, can be conflicting with promoting 
human rights if that implies that, as a consequence, one individual is condemned to earn 
an income incompatible with a decent life, or to be deprived of the access to 
fundamental goods and services. Drawing off water from one region to the other, in 
other words from one community to the other, can encompass such a conflict, for 
example, when access to water is concerned. 
 
 
Market Hegemony and the Right to Water 
 
  One of the crucial questions one should ask about asserting the right to water, as 
with any human right, consists in determining which institution is better qualified to 
ensure every citizen the amount of water that meets both the quantitative and the 
qualitative requirements of the right to water. In recent years state inefficiency in 
delivering some public goods to all has constituted the main argument set forth by those 
who sustain that the market should play a more active role in providing goods and 
services as human rights, be it social security or water. In result we have been 
witnessing extensive privatization of water supply in developed as much as in 
developing countries. We will now argue specifically that the market is not fully 
equipped to play the role of a supplier of goods as human rights because, first, the 
market does not utter social preferences; second, is not accountable; third, is inefficient; 
and finally, because the water market is not a competitive market. 
 
 
The Market does not utter Social preferences 
 
  First of all, when universal rights, such as human rights, are being promoted one 
is asserting a social preference. In the case of the right to water one is, therefore, taken 
to admit that a certain degree in which people’s needs are covered may be better than 
another. A situation in which, for instance, all the population benefits from safe tap 
water is better than any other. Actually, being water a human right, universal coverage  
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is the only acceptable situation, at least as a tendency. Any situation other than universal 
coverage must, therefore, be considered not only inferior but also unacceptable as it 
could constitute a violation of a human right. 
 
  Well, in this sense, the market should have a hard time promoting the right to 
water simply because it does not utter social preferences, such as preferences of 
structure concerning, for example, income distribution or water coverage. As a result of 
all the information conveyed by economic agents, the market can utter many 
preferences, as for instance, what to produce, how and when, but it does not have 
arguments to assert that universal coverage is better than any other structure of water 
distribution. What matters for the market is that agents are satisfied, in other words that 
sellers are able to sell the amounts they wish at market prices, and that buyers are able 
to buy what they intend at the same market prices. The fact that some agents are not 
able to buy what they wish at market prices on account of an excessively tightened 
budget constraint is of almost no concern. In terms of private goods in general this may 
be acceptable but when private goods are taken as rights, as with tap water, exclusion 
becomes intolerable, as purchasing power does not constitute a reason for depriving an 
individual of his rights as a human being. 
 
  Therefore, and despite the fact that there are many examples of public incapacity 
to reach universal water coverage, especially in developing countries, like in Dar-es-
Salam, Tanzania, or in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso, for example where less than 30% 
of the population is connected to the public system of water distribution (UNDP, 2006: 
9), frequently because water is still too expensive for poor households (UNDP, 2006: 
10), water supply by the market has proven to be a poor alternative to public 
distribution. In Manila, Philippines, for instance, Maynilad Water Services, which holds 
Manila's west zone concession, raised tariffs by as much as 400% between 1997 and 
2003. Manila Water Company, the east zone concessionaire, raised water tariffs by 
700% in the same period (Netto, 2005). 
 
  Considering the purchasing power of the average citizen of the Philippines it 
should not be difficult to predict that privatization of water distribution resulted in 
depriving a considerable part of Manila’s population of their right to water. In some of 
the poorer neighbourhoods of La Paz, Bolivia, the multinational company Suez-
Lyonnaise des Eaux, through its local subsidiary Aguas del Illimani, also raised water 
tariffs by 600% in 2004, and the objective of connecting 15.000 households to the water 
distribution system was cut down to zero (Chavez, 2005: 11). In result of the pressure 
exerted by more than six hundred district associations the government eventually 
revoked the concession contract with Aguas del Illimani just like it happened with the 
American based Bechtel in April 2000 (Chavez, 2005: 11). 
 
  Comparative history concerning water supply can also explain why the market 
fails in efficiently promoting the right to water in poor countries. Private companies 
supplying water in developed countries have inherited a heavy infrastructure paid by 
past public investments which supplies universal coverage to an average high-income  
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market. In developing countries, on the contrary, limited and frequently damaged 
infrastructure, low levels of connection and high levels of poverty, increase the tensions 
between business profitability and water supply at a fair price to all. In Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, for example, the water  concession holder managed to expand the 
connections to the supplying system but at a slower pace than what was agreed in the 
concession contract because progress was slower in the poorer areas of the city. In 
Jacarta, Indonesia, in turn, three quarters of the new connections concerned medium and 
high income households or private and public institutions (UNDP, 2006). 
 
 
The Market is not Accountable 
 
  In mainstream economics deprivation has been seen as the outcome of either 
nature’s random behavior or human’s incompetence. In other words deprivation has 
resulted either from nature playing people nasty tricks or people, for whatever reason, 
being incapable of making the right decisions in addressing economic basic problems. 
The search for the good life has signified, therefore, a struggle to dominate nature, or to 
predict and mitigate its whims, and a quest for efficiency in human action. The rhetoric 
of human rights, in contrast, introduces a substantially different approach to deprivation 
by transforming economic problems into possible rights violations, that is to say into 
discriminations or structures that prevent people from exerting rights (Offenheiser and 
Holcombe, 2003: 275). Within the economic problems language one may have to 
surrender to the insolubility of deprivation; on the contrary, within the rights violations 
language deprivation is not inevitable and, therefore, there is no reason for tolerating 
that, for instance, more than a billion people are deprived of a basic access to water. In 
rights language deprivation ceases to be seen as a fate weighing on the economies and 
becomes, rather, an attempt on human rights. Water deprivation should, then, be 
considered illegal. 
 
  Now, if one takes into consideration that in human rights language, rights of 
individuals correspond to duties of other individuals, in other words human rights 
represent the rights which individuals have on others’ demeanor, then if the rights of 
some individuals are not ensured that is due to the fact that other individuals or 
institutions have failed in carrying out their duties. In human rights language, 
responsibility is, therefore, a key issue. When the state fails in ensuring an individual his 
human rights the state is accountable either legally in a court of law or politically 
through elections. If the market fails in ensuring human rights, whom should an 
individual turn to? The state is both elected and known, the market, on the contrary, is, 
by definition, anonymous. In this sense, the market is, therefore, not equipped to 
allocate rights in general and the right to water in particular. 
 
  Economics discourse, itself, favors this market unaccountability. Indeed, 
economics main objective, as it is taught to many undergraduate students around the 
world, is to give an answer to what have been called the economic basic problems. 
These economic basic problems consist firstly in figuring what goods should be  
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produced, how much and when; secondly how should these goods be produced, in other 
words by whom and with which resources; and, finally, to whom these goods should be 
produced, which also means answering questions about the social distribution of 
benefits. Although in some of these aspects a normative approach seems inevitable, the 
economic basic problems are mainly positive. Even when distributional issues are at 
stake it is the arithmetical distributional problem that is being referred to rather than the 
ethical problem. In other words, the basic problem does not concern the distribution 
most adequate to justice but plainly the calculation of the arithmetic distribution which 
ensues from the application of principles of efficiency and rationality, regardless of any 
value judgment. 
 
  Responsibility and democratic control of water suppliers has recently proved to 
be a key element in reaching universal water coverage. In Porto Alegre, Brazil, for 
instance, water services were private until 1904; then the city took them over. Today, 
with the participatory budget process, a municipal management system that was created 
precisely in Porto Alegre, the city people get together in meetings throughout the year 
and decide where the investments of the Municipal Department of Water and Sanitary 
Sewage are going to be made. As one could expect people are mainly interested in 
obtaining wider access to water and sanitation and, thus, between 1989 and 1996, the 
number of households with access to water services rose from 80% to 98%, while the 
percentage of population served by the municipal sewage system rose from 46% to 85% 
(Netto, 2005). 
 
 
The Market is Inefficient 
 
  Water can be used by people for different purposes, from human consumption, 
to production activities such as transportation, industry, agriculture and fishing as well 
as cultural, recreational, leisure, conservation and environmental activities. Taking into 
consideration the diversity of uses and the indispensability of water to satisfy basic 
human needs, a new question is raised, which is how to hierarchize the different types 
of water demand. A competitive market allocates water between different alternative 
uses in accordance with the laws of economic efficiency. These laws only consider for 
human consumption the direct use value and the value of economic goods produced 
when water is used as an input. Now, supporting water allocation between alternative 
uses on laws of economic efficiency can produce inefficient social allocation, especially 
when the arbitrage is between human consumption and agricultural or industrial uses. 
Being inefficient from the point of view of human consumption, this market mediation 
can, then, lead to violating individual’s right to water. 
 
  In this perspective, and given its crucial role to human survival, it is perfectly 
admissible that society sets up priorities. In this context, when water supplies are not 
enough to satisfy all uses it seems quite consensual that priority should be given to 
direct human consumption over other uses, such as leisure. As a matter of fact, this 
priority should be kept even when the alternative use is land irrigation. Though  
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agriculture is vital to guarantee other human rights, like access to food, it is possible to 
farm without irrigation, whereas it is impossible for a human being to survive without 
drinking water. However, in many parts of the planet, mainly in developing countries, 
the lack of access to irrigation water can lead to a denial of the right to food and 
indirectly to a violation of the right to water in those cases where water is indispensable 
to produce crops. 
 
  As seen before, water is in its essence a common pool good. This classification 
is especially appropriate when the different alternative uses of water are hierarchized. In 
order to reach the optimal solution in managing common pool goods, mainstream 
economics can recur to game theory, namely to the prisoner’s dilemma. According to 
this game, the best outcome for each individual user is to act selfishly while the other 
user acts cooperatively and the worst outcome is to act cooperatively while the other 
user acts selfishly. The best outcome for society and resource conservation, the one 
which better secures the right to water, is reached when there is cooperation among the 
several users of the resource. Now, this cooperation is only possible in the presence of a 
strong public or communitarian engagement. This outcome, if used in the arbitrage 
between the different alternative uses or in the allocation between users, maximizes 
social welfare, but demands for a mediation that is beyond the competitive market 
mechanism. 
 
  Furthermore, in order to overcome the conflicts that emerge when common pool 
resources are shared, society should promote the participation of the engaged users in 
the decision-making process about resource allocation and penalize selfish individual 
actions through material and moral sanctions, which strikes the user’s reputation. With 
respect to user participation and resource valuation, group valuation proposed by social 
and political theory has gained increasing attention recently. This valuation method is 
based on the principles of deliberative democracy and assumes that public decision-
making should result from an open public debate rather than from the aggregation of 
separately measured individual preferences (see De Groot, 2006). 
 
  Social outcome validation by game theory and group valuation has been 
implemented for quite a while in many rural and urban communities in the management 
of common pool resources. The above mentioned Tribunal de las Águas de Valência is 
a good example of a millenary communitarian institution with given proofs in allocating 
a common pool good. In this case both economic and political theory and ancestral 
experience indicate the same path, questioning the need for alternative solutions, such as 
the market, to solve the allocation problem of water use. 
 
  Finally, water is exhaustible over a given period of time, which means that its 
use can only be renewable if the extraction rate is lower, or equal, than the recharge 
rate. This is a vital question since the guarantee of human rights in general and the right 
to water in particular does not consider any sort of term beyond which it would be 
acceptable for a human right to be no longer ensured, which implies that water as a 
human right should have a sustainable use. In such circumstances it is difficult to  
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conciliate individual and social interests since no market mechanism can prevent the 
total amount of individual consumption resulting from the maximization of individual 
utility from exceeding the recharge rate. 
 
 
The Water Market is not Competitive 
 
  The next set of arguments against the provision of the human right to water by 
the market stems from the fact that real water markets do not resemble the competitive 
market model (see Henriques et al., 2006). First of all, water presents physical 
characteristics such as mobility and property of state change which implies that it 
should be transported and delivered as a flow rather than as stock. Measuring and 
monitoring this flow is both complex and costly, which can frequently become an 
obstacle to determining clear property and usufructuary rights. 
 
  Second, water is an irreplaceable and indispensable good and, therefore, cannot 
be appropriated in an exclusive regime by any given user or supplier. Third, the almost 
exclusive primary producer is nature which by definition does not behave as an 
economic agent. Fourth, for many communities water is a free gift of nature, and there 
are strong social, cultural and religious objections to establishing a price and 
consequently a market for water. Fifth, the demand for non-consumptive market uses, 
such as recreational and ecological, is a social want for a public good that is likely to be 
undersupplied by a competitive market mechanism. Sixth, the majority of consumptive 
water uses has side effects, such as pollution, which as an externality should be dealt 
within the framework of public water supply and be subjected to public control. 
 
  Finally, for technological reasons, water distribution can be considered a natural 
monopoly in the sense that if competition is allowed between companies in order to get 
hold of a concession, the consumer cannot choose his supplier as he can, for instance, 
with cable or telephone. If one is dissatisfied with one’s cable or telephone supplier, one 
can change. On the contrary, one cannot change on an individual basis one’s water 
supplier. For this set of reasons, therefore, and if economic, social and cultural rights are 
to be taken seriously, it is of the utmost importance that decisions concerning water 
distribution should be made by all those affected by that same distribution, which means 
that it should be submitted do democratic control, implying, thus, public, or at least 
mixed, rather than private management. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  In the previous pages we have seen that rather than charging the hidden interests 
in the economy, somewhat taken as illegitimate or just unethical, for the incapacity in 
asserting the human right to water, one should concentrate on the logic of mainstream 
economic discourse itself. First, economic rationality and human rights seem lost in 
translation.  Indeed, economics postulates are intrinsically contradictory with human  
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rights as the best possible result according to economic logic may easily constitute a 
violation according to human rights principles. 
 
  Second, by making the market an absolute value and an infallible means of 
rationally allocating goods, mainstream economics intends to reduce all categories of 
goods, and, thus, of rights, to only one,  the commodity.  This commodification of 
society, which is at the foundation of mainstream economics discourse, is contradictory 
with a society whose purpose is to enhance human rights. In this society accountability 
and universality are keywords and market ideology ignores both. Human rights decline, 
or at least stagnation, should not be seen as the outcome of doing wrongly the right 
economics, then, but of rightly doing the wrong economics. 
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